Milan Kundera's lovely phrase.8 Those who subscribe to this tradition do so for forward-looking reasons; they seek "to make connections with the past in order to illuminate the problems of the present and the potential of the future."9 History is worth fighting over because the past is "used to sanction or sanctify authority"10 and provides the means by which we define ourselves and our community.11 Thus, history "doesn't just reflect; it provides a forum for readjudicating power and interests."12 Like Kousser, legal scholars in this tradition fear the Rehnquist Court's resort to abstract principles in equal protection cases because it allows the Court to ignore how these principles are refracted and distorted when applied in the real world.13 Recognizing that it is especially "[i]n the freighted area of race and public policy" that "abstract Concerns about acontextual decisionmaking are especially apt in the voting rights context. A rigid adherence to bright-line rules seems to be the usual reaction of courts to the difficulties involved in conceptualizing how to allocate political power fairly among voters, the tensions between traditional tenets of liberalism and the aggregative aspects of voting, and the types of judgments necessary to guarantee racial minorities a full opportunity to participate in the political process.16 Courts shy away from nuanced, contextual analysis and qualitative evaluation, preferring instead formulaic approaches that require only quantitative judgments. Whether one thinks the courts' resort to formalism stems from a healthy fear of traveling farther into the political thicket or is simply an ineffective attempt to dodge these questions, it is hard to deny its presence in voting rights jurisprudence.17
Bright-line rules can, of course, provide sensible proxies for achieving broader substantive aims. The problem in voting rights jurisprudence, however, is that too often courts have stopped treating these bright-line rules as means to an end; the rules have become ends unto themselves. A resort to this variant of "formalism" inevitably results in the mindless application of these rules to historical and normative contexts where they do not fit. The average judge prefers such a formal approach to probing the rule's normative underpinnings or factual assumptions and evaluating whether they still hold in the case before her.
One example of this trend outside of the Shaw line of cases is the courts' section 2 jurisprudence. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits racial vote dilution.18 In the early stages of the doctrine's development, courts assessed whether racial minorities had a fair opportunity to participate in the political process by examining a wide range of historical and qualitative concerns. These came to be known as the "Senate factors" after they were endorsed in a Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendments to section 2. 19 Over the years, however, courts resolving section 2 claims have largely abandoned the qualitative analysis required by the Senate factors. Indeed, in 1986, the Supreme Court effectively instructed lower courts to disregard those qualitative measures and focus instead on the three Gingles preconditions,20 mechanical proxies for assessing whether racial minorities' potential voting strength has been undermined. Thus, even without some qualitative proof of dilution, plaintiffs were very likely to persuade a court to invalidate a redistricting scheme as long as they succeeded in satisfying the Gingles preconditions. 21 While the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. DeGrandy22 seemed to breathe new life into the Senate factors, it failed to deter the courts' marked proclivity for mechanical, quantitative rules. Although the Court specifically reminded courts to pay attention to the [T]he history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986).
20. According to Thornburg v. Gingles, plaintiffs must prove that (1) the state could have drawn an additional, compact majority-minority district but failed to do so; (2) the minority group is politically "cohesive" -that is, its members vote in a similar fashion; and (3) the white electorate votes as a bloc, thus enabling whites usually to defeat the minority group's preferred candidates at the polls. 478 U.S. at 50-51.
21. See Jenkins v. Red Clay Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135 (3rd Cir. 1993).
512 U.S. 997 (1994).
Senate factors,23 it offered a new standard for evaluating dilution proportionality -that was equally amenable to mechanical implementation. Proportionality is an easily applied mathematical standard that requires a court to count the number of districts group members are capable of controlling on election day24 rather than examine the quality of representation they ultimately receive. Unsurprisingly, despite the Supreme Court's insistence that proportionality is not a "safe harbor" for defendants,25 courts have begun to grant "extremely heavy weight" to proportionality in assessing dilution claims.26 A particularly striking example of this new approach is Barnett v. City of Chicago.27 There, the Seventh Circuit ignored virtually all of the qualitative measures of representation, including the nine Senate factors that were once the touchstone of any dilution claim. It based a finding of section 2 liability entirely upon the State's failure to provide an exact proportional share of districts to African-American voters. It is not surprising that courts like the Seventh Circuit have moved toward a mechanical approach to section 2 claims. The Senate Factors require courts to make judgments about the continuing effects of past discrimination, the quality of representation received by racial minorities, the substantive content of their policy preferences, the constitutive aspects of participation, and the dynamics of the legislative process. All of these issues, in turn, require contextualized judgments about race relations, the preferences of members of different racial groups, and the allocation of political power -assessments judges are often reluctant to make.
There are costs, however, to adopting the more mechanical, formal approach to voting claims that we see in recent section 2 cases. First, proportionality becomes an end unto itself rather than a means to an end (here, a well-functioning democracy). Courts may thus neglect other essential aspects of the democratic process. For example, under the current approach to section 2, courts tend to "see a single event [the election] as the culmination of political participation and the focus of voting rights efforts."28 Second, rigid adherence to a formal ap- factors as a counterpoint to their criticisms of the formulaic approach of current dilution doctrine, which they argue focuses too heavily on electoral outcomes at the expense of proach tends to foreclose certain types of equal protection claims simply because the discrimination is not the type of harm the bright-line rule was designed to address.29 In the long run, voting rights jurisprudence may be so distanced from voting realities that equal protection loses its power to effect meaningful change and may work in counterproductive ways when applied.
B. What History Tells Us About Shaw
All of these concerns animate Kousser's challenge to the formalism readily identifiable in the Supreme Court's Shaw decisions. Shaw is mistaken, Kousser argues, because it substitutes empty rhetoric and rigid rules for nuanced, contextual analysis (p. 7). In this sense, Shaw is part of the trend toward formalism we see in other voting rights cases. Kousser's main focus is what he sees as the Court's rigid adherence to the rule of colorblindness. And despite his apparent acceptance of Miller's predominant factor standard,30 his historical analysis provides an equally powerful case against the application of conventional motive-based equal protection analysis to redistricting. In both instances, the Court has taken bright-line rules that are best understood as means to an end (a healthy multiracial society) and treated them as ends unto themselves. In clinging to these two rules, the Court has blinded itself to political and racial complexities that such rules are not robust enough to address.
For Kousser, a full understanding of historical context requires us to focus upon institutions. We should worry about the Supreme Court's Shaw jurisprudence precisely because "institutions and institutional rules -not customs, ideas, attitudes, culture, or private behavior -have primarily shaped race relations in America" (p. 1). As those first few lines of the book make clear, Kousser is an academic maverick. In emphasizing the importance of law and formal institutions, Kousser is fighting a marked shift toward cultural and social analysis in history departments and law schools throughout the country.31 And, as with everything else in the book, Kousser never does anything by halves. Rather than suggesting that those moving toward cultural analysis have struck the wrong balance and placed too little take advantage of racial cleavages, he provides significant evidence that "matters of racial power" as much as "unthinking racial animosity" have undermined minority voting rights in the recent past.36
In the chapter on Los Angeles (Chapter Two), for instance, Kousser offers a fact-intensive, well-documented tale about rank hypocrisy and the cynical manipulation of race. We see that although white politicians consistently ignored the needs of the Latino community, they never hesitated to invoke these concerns to justify their actions or to manipulate Latino interests to further their own political aims (p. 120-34). Kousser thus complicates the Supreme Court's conventional model of racial motive, which is largely preoccupied with manifestations of outright racial hostility and premised on the assumption that race can be separated from politics.
Kousser's chapters on the redistricting battles that took place in Texas and North Carolina during the 1990s (Chapters Five & Six) similarly document the tangled relationship between race and politics and cast doubt upon the simplistic approach of the Shaw cases. While the Supreme Court confidently identified a "predominantly racial motive" from the shape of the districts and scattered pieces of evidence from the record,37 Kousser describes the astounding complexity of the racial and political tradeoffs made to create those challenged districts. His adept use of historical narrative provides a far richer account of these cases than the Court's decisions and, once again, muddies the motive-based distinction the Supreme Court has tried to draw. Ironically, while Kousser seems to accept the Supreme Court's premise that Miller's predominant factor standard serves a meaningful analytical role in the context of redistricting,38 his detailed analysis provides as compelling a refutation of that premise as one could hope to craft.
These chapters also highlight the significant role that institutions and legal rules play in shaping race relations, another concern Kousser raises about Shaw. Kousser does not simply depict racial minorities as the passive victims of private white oppression. He shows that racial minorities could and did resist disenfranchisement, and that whites often had to modify institutional structures to achieve their aims.39 In his chapter on Georgia, for example, Kousser describes the emergence of fairly powerful groups of African Americans in Macon during the first half of the twentieth century; these organizations were able to attract 36. P. 67; see also p. 9. If Kousser merely seeks to downplay, but not eliminate, normative debate in the equal protection context, there is a second reason to critique Colorblind Injustice. As Section II.B argues, equal protection doctrine unmoored from an explicit normative theory leads to a different variant of the rule-bound formalism Kousser decries. Moreover, Kousser never fully explains why a robust normative debate is less likely to lead to "truth" -or at least that norms are less likely to constrain judicial discretion -than the empirical battles he prefers.
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A. The Role of Normative Debate in Shaw
The main problem with Kousser's decision to eschew normative debate in challenging Shaw is that we need a normative theory to make the jump from "is" to "ought" -to decide what Kousser's description of the past tells us about the Supreme Court's current equal protection jurisprudence. For example, much of Colorblind Injustice is devoted to questions about racial intent and effect. Kousser asserts that these "are essentially empirical rather than legal questions" (pp. 5, 318); "delineations of intent" are meant "to be factual inquiries, not roundabout ways of weighing competing interests" (p. 494 n.4). That assumption is difficult to sustain.45 Even setting aside the problem of reconstructing another actor's motive, any definition of cause and effect will be fraught with normative questions and the "weighing [of] competing interests," and those normative concerns will inevitably affect how we filter and translate historical fact into legal judgments.
Consider the differences in approach under a highly stylized taxonomy of three basic theories of equal protection jurisprudence: (1) the antidiscrimination principle,46 (2) a subordination theory,47 and (3) 44. Horwitz, History and Theory, supra note 10, at 1835 ("Every system of legal architecture incorporates deep into that structure a set of normative premises about the proper way to talk about law."). an expressive harms approach.48 Assuming that we could agree upon the "facts," we might reach different conclusions about intent and effect depending on which theory we chose. Those who subscribe to the antidiscrimination principle are likely to define intent as the subjective "intent to harm" someone on account of race.49 Those who adhere to the subordination theory, in contrast, seek to prevent action that has the effect (intentional or not) of further disadvantaging a group that has traditionally been relegated to an inferior position in society.50 And those who subscribe to an expressive harm theory of constitutional wrongs will conceive of illicit intent as the social meaning conveyed by a decision, whether or not subjectively intended. Further, the "effect" with which they are concerned involves the social values the state expresses when it adopts a classification.51 For all of these reasons, a reasonable person might reach different conclusions about the same set of historical facts depending on which theory of intent and effect she employed.
We should decisionmakers act "in spite of" the impact of their actions on a protected group -his view of intent is clearly more expansive than the Supreme Court's view.
Such an approach, of course, itself suggests a particular normative theory of equality. Kousser's theory retains the notion of intentionality but expands intent beyond the narrow confines of animus. Selfinterested decisions to harm racial minorities are thus censured in the same way as those based on racial hostility -an interesting take on the nature of partisanship. But the baseline for measuring equality is not a results-based standard. Instead, Kousser seems to retain the notion of "innocence" -that the law should not censure decisionmakers who inadvertently harm racial minorities, even if their power is exercised in, and possibly derived from, a social context permeated by racial hierarchies. That view itself reflects heavily freighted assumptions about the role of race in our society.
Kousser's broader theory for critiquing Shaw is similarly normative. His criticisms of Shaw suggest that he subscribes to Katzenbach's one-way ratchet approach53 -if a policy promotes the interests of racial minorities, we should adopt it. Shaw is wrong, in Kousser's view, because it harms the interests of racial minorities and consistently reaches results that undermine their political power.4
One could certainly develop a coherent defense of this normative approach by drawing upon the history Kousser documents in the first chapters of the book.55 One could also defend this approach against countervailing normative concerns.5 Unfortunately, Kousser does neither.
For example, Kousser never specifies how we should define the "interests" of racial minorities. The definition of minority interests, however, is fraught with complex normative judgments. 55. In addition to providing ample evidence to suggest that remedial efforts to aid racial minorities are still necessary, Kousser has shown that race and politics are so intertwined as to be inseparable. This evidence could justify what amounts to a res ipsa loquitur approach to voting rights: because racial animus is so deeply embedded in political decisions, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can assume that any decision that harms racial minorities was undertaken for an invidious purpose. See Deborah C. A second, related problem with Kousser's unwillingness to engage in normative debate is that he and the Shaw Court end up talking past one another. Kousser spends a great deal of time attacking the theory of colorblindness on the ground that its implementation will harm the interests of racial minorities. Nonetheless, although he criticizes a doctrine plainly grounded in fears of essentialism, Kousser never convincingly addresses this normative concern. Instead, he asserts that empirical facts tell us everything we need to know. He writes that the Supreme Court should not worry about the use of "race as a proxy" in redistricting because race works as a proxy only if "political behavior [is] truly strongly correlated with race," and "not if it were an irrational or demeaning stereotype."59 But one might well be concerned about the use of racial or gender classifications on normative grounds even when they provide a fairly good proxy for the characteristics or behavior of group members.60 57 Moreover, a sustained normative discussion of equal protection would reveal that colorblindness is too easy a target. One can surely dismiss the notion that colorblindness should be our legal ideal and still be worried about race-conscious redistricting. The difficulty for Shaw opponents is not persuading those in the middle of this debate that race-conscious districting is sometimes an acceptable means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the hard part is articulating the limits to that principle. How far should we go to augment minority electoral strength? Should we abandon territorially based districting for those groups unable to aggregate their votes effectively?
Is our goal integrationist -fostering interracial coalitions -or empowerment and independence for minority communities? Is raceconscious districting consistent with the tenets of liberalism, or does it lead us to the problem of essentialism by requiring us to make assumptions about individuals based on their group membership? And if we think race-conscious districting inevitably leads to essentialization, how do we evaluate the costs and benefits of such actions?
I should note that my call for a normative defense does not stem from a dislike of Kousser's policy recommendations. Like Kousser, I am not ready to abandon territorial-based districting entirely. But I suspect we get there in quite different ways. To put it in extraordinarily abbreviated terms, in my view the debate over territorial-based districting involves a choice about where we want the bulk of democratic compromise to take place: at the ballot box or on the legislative floor. In many situations, compromise is likely to be easier at the legislative level, and in some instances that in itself may favor -even mandate -adoption of a non-geographic/interest-based form of allocating political power, such as cumulative voting. But, speaking in unforgivably broad generalities, the risk involved in a cumulative voting scheme is that too much of the democratic compromise necessary to pass legislation will take place solely at the legislative level. A cumulative voting scheme allows voters to disperse into small, interest-based groups and elect candidates that closely mirror their own preferences. The result tends to be a more diverse set of legislators. At some point, however, a move to the middle will be necessary to pass legislation -preferences must be ranked, compromises made, trade-offs accepted. Under a cumulative voting scheme, many of the judgments involved in this move to the middle will be made directly by the legislators themselves, not the voters.61 61. This concern would be far weaker, however, if we could develop a more dynamic relationship between representative and constituent. Concerns about voters' passivity and lack of involvement in legislative compromise might not be relevant if legislators and their In a territorial-based scheme, by contrast, voters are usually clumped together with people who do not share their interests. They cannot align along a narrowly defined set of interests but must instead find a candidate who can reach out to many different groups and interests. In effect, voters themselves must make at least an initial step toward the middle if they hope to have any effect on legislative outcomes. And if one believes, as I do, that voting involves constitutive and expressive elements,62 there is certainly something to be said for allowing "the people" to be directly involved in this type of democratic compromise. Indeed, presumably the reason that most of us find consociational democracy so unpalatable is that sometimes we would rather force people with different interests to find a consensus candidate and platform rather than allow them to stand on the sidelines as their chosen representatives forge those compromises. In short, the compromise that takes place on election day in a territorial-based scheme ensures that voters make at least some of the judgments involved in the inevitable move to the middle.
Because territorial-based districting takes place in such varied contexts, it also offers us a laboratory to engage in democratic experimentation. It provides an opportunity to discover which districting schemes best facilitate compromises on all sides, particularly by those who have traditionally enjoyed a disproportionate share of political power. Indeed, at least one recent empirical study suggests that the creation of majority-minority districts has led to new interracial coalitions and a decrease in racially polarized voting in the South.63
Where voting is racially polarized, however, drawing districts that foster democratic compromise among different racial groups requires a firm understanding of the context in which those compromises take place. For example, the supposed trade-off between "independence" and "integration" -between political control and political influence64 64. In the political science literature, this debate is cast in terms of descriptive and substantive representation. Political scientists debate whether racial minorities benefit more from majority-minority districts, where they can elect candidates of their own race if they choose to do so, or from "influence districts," which allow them to elect a larger number of white legislators who will promote their substantive preferences. See supra text accompanying note 57.
-may be a false one. Those who insist that our aspiration should be political integration may discover that granting racial minorities political independence is a necessary precondition for achieving that goal.65 On this view, the interracial coalitions we see emerging in the South could not have occurred without giving African-American voters a measure of political independence. Put another way, meaningful democratic compromise may require coequals; compromise and coalitions that stem from necessity rather than choice do little to promote democratic values.
I also agree with Kousser that race-conscious districting ought to be allowed in certain circumstances. We must come to grips with the fact that territorial-based districting cannot achieve any of these democratic aspirations without race-conscious districting, thus forcing us to deal squarely with the costs of essentialization. I am ready to accept those costs when they are weighed against the benefits of majority-minority districts and the costs of the alternative, raceblinding districting. In any case, all of these questions involve difficult and compelling debates, and it would have been well worth Kousser's time to address them.
Finally, even when viewed from a purely instrumental perspective, Kousser's reluctance to engage in explicit normative debate is puzzling. Normative theory and historical context are often so intertwined as to be inseparable, especially when we are discussing race.66 Because "debates cast in empirical terms often masquerade for deeper, underlying disagreements about cultural assumptions and normative ideals," I suspect that the empirical battle Kousser wishes to wage cannot be won without a normative fight.67
It is not only that normative theory is our framework for deciding what "is" -the means by which we assess the empirical facts before us. Normative theory is inherently forward-looking; it tells us which facts ought to matter going forward. An adherent to the principle of colorblindness, for example, might willingly concede the existence of racism in the past and present. But she is looking toward a future of colorblindness, and she might think that the bright promise of that future requires the law -the textual embodiment of our future aspirations -to ignore these realities. 
B. Normative Theory Provides a Necessary Anchor for Good Judging
If, as seems more likely, Kousser is merely trying to downplay, not eliminate, the role of normative debate in equal protection, there is another reason to criticize his approach. The failure to engage in normative debate will result in a different variant of the formalism Kousser criticizes in Shaw. If legal rules are not firmly anchored to a normative theory, at some point they can cease functioning as means to an end and become ends unto themselves. The normative principles embedded in those rules will thus be lost, and the rules will be applied even in contexts where those normative principles would counsel a different result. As with Shaw, the rule will be all that matters.
Consider the development of the one-person, one-vote cases. These cases were originally fashioned as equal protection claims based on the assumption that rural voters had different interests than urban voters.68 And the Court's early articulation of the one-person, one-' vote principle might have eventually developed into a sufficiently robust theory of democracy to take that truth into account.69
But that was not the path the Court took. Eventually, the Court simply stopped talking about which voters were affected by the skewed districting system or trying to develop a theory of democratic governance to explain why judicial action was required. Unsurprisingly, the injury in these cases became quite abstract and was eventually defined in highly formal terms. In the absence of a normative theory justifying the Court's intervention into the democratic process, it was difficult to identify an appropriate limiting principle. The abstract right to equality inevitably became an end unto itself, rather than a means to an end.70 Thus, in the one-person, one-vote cases, precise numeric equality became the standard for equal protection with- In the absence of a theory for justifying or limiting judicial intervention, equality among counting mechanisms will become an end unto itself, and we will never have normative explanation for why (and when) the Fourteenth Amendment demands judicial intervention. It is hard to see why such a barren approach is superior to the formalism Kousser decries in Shaw.
Interestingly, the same problem afflicts the Supreme Court's most recent Shaw decision: Hunt v. Cromartie.74 Hunt is one of the rare Shaw cases reaching the result Kousser seeks -it upholds the constitutionality of a majority-minority district on purely factual grounds. But both Justice Breyer's majority decision and Justice Thomas's dissent are strikingly formal and mechanical. Each takes an agreed-upon set of facts, applies the same standard, and reaches dramatically different conclusions. Even someone who approves of the result will find the decision unsatisfying. Because both opinions play down the normative underpinnings of Shaw in precisely the manner Kousser seems to endorse, they are bereft of any sense of the broader issues at stake. This is the jurisprudence of the technocrat: mechanical, seemingly neutral adjudication that conceals, but does not eliminate, the normative significance of the decision.
C. The Quest for Normative "Truths"
A second problem with Kousser's heavy reliance on empirical facts over normative debate is that he never explains why a battle of historical experts is any more likely to lead us to "truth" than a robust It is odd that Kousser takes such a strong position in favor of objectivity given that his scholarship traces the path not taken.78 After all, presumably the main reason to privilege facts over normative theory is the assumption that empirical research involves a "right" answer. But Kousser's scholarship seeks to uncover the causal chains that were broken, the opportunities that were squandered, in order to persuade us that the history we know was not foreordained. Thus, while his scholarship is rigorously empirical, it also requires the imaginative power to discern what might have been -something that does not lend itself easily to a label like "right" or "wrong."79 It is equally odd that Kousser so easily accepts the notion that normative debate is inherently subjective while dismissing out of hand challenges to the objectivity of historical scholarship. After all, both are grounded in the same type of concerns. Assuming that it is possible to separate empirical debates from their normative underpinnings,80 if Kousser is confident that historical and empirical evidence can demonstrate that the Shaw majority was wrong and the Warren Court was right on the facts, why can't we be just as confident (or at least hopeful) that serious debate will help us distinguish "good" normative theories from "bad" ones?81 Similarly, those who subscribe to the uneasy compromise over objectivity adopted by historians and legal scholars alike82 may wonder why normative arguments cannot be subjected to "pragmatic truth-testing"83 in the same way we test hiswe would say naive -realism"); id. at 254 ("conced[ing] the impossibility of any research being neutral" while believing in "the viability of stable bodies of knowledge that can be communicated, built upon, and subjected to testing"); NOVICK, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that "there is less talk" among historians "of approaching the past 'without preconceptions' " and "a tendency to think of the collective voyage toward the truth as involving tacking, rather than sailing in a straight line toward that final destination"). The compromise adopted in both disciplines resembles a metaphor Martha Minow shared with me: "none of us can precisely identify where 'East' is, but we all think we can move in that direction."
See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
I am indebted to Richard Parker for raising this point.
But see text accompanying notes 66-67.
81. One might argue that historical analysis is more likely to get us to "truth" because everyone is able to take part in the debate. Ronald Dworkin makes a version of this argument in distinguishing historical analysis from what he terms "causal social science": historical judgments provide "refuge from the arbitrary" because "they must be framed in the critical vocabulary of the community in question." Dworkin, supra note 42, at 6. Significantly, however, Dworkin argues that such "interpretive science" is little different from traditional normative debate in law, id., which similarly allows all members of the community to take part.
82. Supra text accompanying note 77. As an aspirational matter, I am ready to concede that debate need not be carried out in a neutral, respectful way -while it is quite likely that we will generally have a better and more productive debate without people shouting at each other, shouting serves a purpose on some occasions.92 And if there is any place for strong rhetoric, it is in con-88. Similarly, the very first footnote of the book's first chapter opens with a salvo against "the racialization of the crimes and welfare issues, the political assaults on legal and illegal immigrants, the California and congressional pushes for totally dismantling affirmative action, and the middle-brow tracts of Hernstein and Murray (1994), D'Souza (1995), and Roberts and Stratton (1995)." P. 470 n.l. Even one who believes these are all worthy targets for criticism might be a bit startled to discover this attack so early in Kousser's book. demning those who we believe have denied racial minorities a fair chance to participate in the political process. Moreover, I would not suggest that Kousser's efforts at advocacy undermine his scholarship.93 I also recognize that a preference for a deliberative tone necessarily implicates the debates about objectivity discussed in Part II.94 Our choice of tone, like our choice of message, may reinforce false assumptions about objectivity and reify the hierarchies that undergird them.95 But those costs must be balanced against the effect that a consistent use of Kousser's rhetoric may have upon judges. While the private rant is an essential part of being human, public rants convey a certain message about judges and their (in)capacity to set aside their own prejudices. The real question is, if we speak to judges as if they are their better selves, is it more likely that they will act as such? If the answer to that question is "yes," then there are long-term costs to Kousser's rhetoric. I am not ready to say we should not yell on occasion to shake judges out of their complacency.96 And surely if we need to designate an occasional yeller, Kousser would be a good pick. But the unrelenting use of this type of rhetoric is a game not worth the candle.
See Ronald
In any case, even taking all of these concerns into account, one can still criticize Kousser on instrumental grounds. If Kousser wants to be an advocate, he should try to be an effective one. Kousser makes two mistakes in this regard. First, he ignores the cultural traditions of the audience he is trying to reach. Second, Kousser's language sometimes leads him to overstate his claims and thus, in the long run, undermines his effectiveness. often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated."); see also JAMES CARVILLE, WE'RE RIGHT, THEY'RE WRONG (1996) (offering a fine example of the power of the rant).
93. To the contrary, Kousser's role as an advocate may have sparked his best, most creative scholarship. As one commentator noted of C. Vann Woodward's work, it was his "desire to provide southerners with a more hopeful, diverse, and discontinuous 'usable past' " that was "critical to opening a whole new field for study and infusing it with a startling perspec- One problem with Kousser's rhetoric is that he uses the type of language one would employ at a political rally to address a contest being played out on the Supreme Court's turf. What Kousser fails to grasp is that the trick to battles waged there is to distance oneself from one's role as advocate. To the lawyers, judges, and legal academics Kousser addresses, overblown rhetoric is generally the sign of an advocate with a weak case, and interdisciplinary work like Colorblind Injustice is likely to be most successful when it takes into account the professional norms of the community it is addressing.
If the language of neutrality is important for lawyers, it is at least as important for academics who wish to influence public debate. From a purely instrumental point of view, if academics have what economists would call a comparative advantage, it is that people (rightly or wrongly) turn to us for neutral, dispassionate assessments.97 Ironically, our apparent removal from the world gives us power in it. Whether or not Kousser is any less "objective" than other scholars, he loses the appearance of being so.98 And to paraphrase an overused phrase in Shaw, advocacy is one area in which appearances do matter.99
Kousser's rhetoric seems especially unlikely to move his real audience -the Shaw majority. While few believe judges are capable of overcoming all of their biases and predispositions, most assume that they have at least absorbed the norm of neutrality and believe themselves to be capable of objective judgments.100 Charges of partisan bias are unlikely to impress a judge deeply steeped in the traditions of the legal culture and firmly persuaded of her own objectivity. Again, from an instrumental perspective, a reasoned legal argument that shows that a judge is making herself vulnerable to such accusations by adopting seemingly inconsistent or unreasoned opinions is much more likely to give her pause.101 In short, if history "must be a personal possession to do its work,"102 then Kousser's rhetoric is likely selfdefeating. 104. Kousser rebukes her for terming "the principal Republican alternative to the second black-majority district 'reasonably compact,' even though it was thirty miles longer and much more difficult to traverse than the district actually adopted by the North Carolina legislature." P. 385. Kousser concludes from this fact that Justice O'Connor "meant a district's ugliness to remain entirely in the eye of whatever judge beheld it." Id. Perhaps. But one might also conclude that Justice O'Connor made the same type of assumption that many of us who are not political scientists make about compactness -that compactness is something that can be assessed by looking at it rather than something that should be measured in functional terms. See Cain, supra note 33, at 77. To be fair to Kousser, it is not clear that these data were available at the time he wrote Colorblind Injustice. Indeed, while Kousser acknowledges that the Republicans thought that the creation of a large number of majority-minority districts would benefit their party, p. 439, he also notes a study suggesting that "compact districts tend to minimize the number of seats Democrats win." P. 501 n.17.
121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001).
507 U.S. 146 (1993).
[Vol. 99:1298 opportunity to address the question first."4 Moreover, the decision was unanimous, a fact that is at odds with Kousser's theory of partisanship.
The only other case Kousser offers to demonstrate a pattern of affirming Republican-drawn plans is the Court's summary affirmance of California's districting plan in DeWitt v. Wilson.l5 Even setting aside the fact that at least one prominent voting rights scholar has termed the districts affirmed in DeWitt "relatively compact,""6 something that would justify distinguishing DeWitt from most of the districts invalidated by the Court, there are a number of other explanations for this summary affirmance. First, California's districting plan was drawn by a nominally bipartisan redistricting commission rather than a selfinterested state legislature.7" Second, the commission in California drew lines with large building blocks -census tracts -rather than the much smaller census blocks used in almost all of the other districting plans struck down by the Court."18 Third, the timing of the de- 125. Kousser's response to this argument, which he attributes to an "uncritical biographer" (p. 437), is not persuasive. First, he argues, Justice O'Connor "has been a leader, not a follower" because she has "writ[ten] the principal opinions in" a number of major equal protection cases. P. 437. That evidence, however, simply confirms Justice O'Connor's status as the swing vote; Supreme Court watchers know that the best way of guaranteeing that the swing vote sticks is to assign the opinion to that Justice. And while Kousser himself refuses to accept the characterization of Justice O'Connor as a "moderate" because her opinions "take quite radical ideological positions," "contain strong, absolutist statements of 'colorblind individualism,'" and consistently disfavor "the minority litigant," (p. 437), Kousser fails to acknowledge that "moderate" is a relative term here. In the context of Shaw, for example, her willingness to accept section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as a compelling state interest, Bush, 917 U.S. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and her insistence that raceconscious districting is at least sometimes permissible, id. at 958 (O'Connor, J., concurring), place her squarely in the middle of the Rehnquist Court.
to find a middle way in answering these difficult questions,126 and thus will find Kousser's accusations of bad faith too harsh.
This leads me to my final criticism of Kousser's rhetoric. Both because Kousser fails to engage in an explicit normative debate about the use of race and because the language he uses to attack Shaw is so strong, Colorblind Injustice leaves one with the distinct impression that Shaw is an easy case, so easy that we would second-guess the motives of those who think that the questions raised by this intersection of race and politics are difficult. The book never creates enough space for someone who may ultimately agree that Shaw is mistaken to be concerned about the role that race plays in redistricting or to think that broader normative principles are at stake here.127 And that is unfortunate, for one would hope that such a powerful challenge to Shaw would be capable of changing the minds of those in the middle of this debate. 127. Even Justice Brennan wrote in his agonized concurrence to United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey that race-based districting "raises particularly sensitive issues of doctrine and policy." 430 U.S. 144, 171 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Kousser dismisses one academic's reliance on these concurrences to establish that race-conscious districting may raise hard constitutional questions as "unconvincing." P. 500 n.4. Yet the only support Kousser offers for this dismissal is that the scholar "does not note the subtleties of the earlier opinions," which Kousser notably does not articulate, "or sufficiently emphasize the factual differences between Wright and Shaw," the only example of which Kousser cites is the somewhat odd distinction he believes the Constitution draws between the intentionally created, race-consciously drawn "86 percent nonwhite district in [Wright] versus a 57 percent black district in [Shaw] ." P. 500 n.4.
